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A B S T R A C T
We examine the impact of religious identity and village-level religious fragmentation on other-regarding pre-
ferences. We report on a series of two-player binary Dictator experiments conducted on a sample of 516 Hindu
and Muslim participants in rural West Bengal, India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players and the
degree of religious fragmentation in the village where subjects reside. Both Muslims’ and Hindus’ aversion to
advantageous inequality declines as the probability of facing an out-group member increases. We find no evi-
dence of aversion to disadvantageous inequality on either religious sample. Both Muslim and Hindu participants
display aversion to advantageous inequality in both fragmented villages and homogeneous villages. The effect of
village fragmentation on aversion to disadvantageous inequality differs across religious groups.
1. Introduction
Over the last 20 years, development economists have uncovered a
negative correlation between social fragmentation and economic per-
formance (Easterly & Levine, 1999; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly,
Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Khwaja, 2009).
Social identity theory makes a plausible case for why socially homo-
geneous groups might be more cooperative. Indeed, group membership
positively affects cooperation in the lab, provided that group identity is
sufficiently salient (Eckel & Grossman, 2005; Charness, Rigotti, &
Rustichini, 2007), as well as in high stakes, lab-in-the-field experiments
with real social groups (Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2006; Chakravarty,
Fonseca, Ghosh, & Marjit, 2016b). Social preferences have long been
identified as a primary mechanism through which identity operates
(Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Chen & Li, 2009).
In the present paper, we examine the extent to which social pre-
ferences are affected by social fragmentation, and if this occurs as a
result of in-group/out-group differences. We estimate group-contingent
social preferences through individuals’ choices over income distribu-
tions. The relevant dimension in our experiment is religious affiliation:
Hindu and Muslim. We conducted our experiment in rural West Bengal,
India, where religious identity and religious fragmentation are central
to almost all aspects of life.
Our experimental design varies the group membership of the dic-
tator player and the recipient player to generate in-group/out-group
pairings. The main innovation of our experimental design is that it
varies the degree of social fragmentation within the locality of the ex-
perimental subjects. We do so by selecting villages on the basis of their
religious breakdown: Hindu-dominated, Muslim-dominated, and vil-
lages with a relatively equal proportion of both religious groups. This
quasi-experimental dimension of our design is motivated by the insights
from Allport (1954) and Brewer (1991, 1999) that individuals may
identify more with their in-group in a heterogenous environment than
in a homogenous environment. Therefore, inter-group biases ought to
be more pronounced in more heterogenous communities.
We find consistent evidence with our hypothesis. We find in-group/
out-group differences in social preferences, in that subjects are on
average more averse to inequality when sharing financial resources
with an in-group member than with an out-group member. As pre-
dicted, those differences in preferences are more pronounced in more
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T
socially fragmented villages. However, our estimates of inequality
aversion are rather small compared to estimates from similar tasks in a
minimal group paradigm (and no fragmentation). This suggests that
inequality aversion may not be the principal channel through which
group membership operates in religious identities.
Understanding social preferences is important because they afford
us insight into individual preferences for redistribution (Dimick, Rueda,
& Stegmueller, 2018). Social identity is important to consider in the
context of redistribution, since it creates a wedge between inequality
and group membership. The former is typically conceptualized and/or
measured at a level that supersedes group identities (nationality being
the obvious exception). But reducing overall inequality may come at the
expense of reducing inter-group income or status differences, which
may be unpalatable to those with strong in-group preferences and lead
to the emergence of political movements that cater to specific social
groups. The BJP is a prominent case in point in India, although ex-
amples abound worldwide, including Northern Ireland (where the two
main religious groups are Catholics and Protestants).
Tajfel et al. (1971) first established in-group/out-group biases in
distribution games using an unincentivized third-party dictator game,
although they did not operate in an expected utility framework. The
first paper that establishes and formally quantifies an effect of identity
on preferences is Chen and Li (2009), who find in-group biases in social
preferences in a minimal group paradigm. Our results show a much
weaker effect of social identity on preferences than that estimated by
Chen and Li (2009). Our results are also in line with a recent wave of
work on identity and redistribution. Berge et al. (2015) study the role of
ethnic biases on the standard dictator game in Kenya. They find no
evidence of ethnic biases in preferences. Kranton, Pease, Sanders, and
Huettel (2016) study the role of group affiliation on social preferences.
They study this both in a minimal group framework, as well as political
membership (Democratic vs. Republican). They find large hetero-
geneity in their sample: some subjects exhibit no difference in social
preferences towards in-group or out-group, while others exhibit in-
group biases regardless of whether their group is minimal or political in
nature – the latter individuals are more likely to affiliate with political
parties than the former. The authors suggest that group divisions may
be more important than group identity. In other words, our results
confirm a line of work that suggests that distributional preferences may
not be the main channel through which social identity operates.
Social preferences are an important determinant of cooperation in
social dilemmas (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). The literature on social
identity has identified three mechanisms for why group membership
may affect cooperation in social dilemmas. Individuals may care more
for the welfare of their own in-group members than for that of outsiders
(Chen & Li, 2009). Group membership may change individuals’ beliefs
about others’ cooperativeness, which in turn may amplify the effect of
social preferences (Berge et al., 2015). Group membership can also
introduce prescriptions of behavior, which facilitates cooperation
among group members (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). It is still an open
question as to which of the three mechanisms is most important. By
measuring the impact of religious identity on distributional preferences,
we are able to inform the existing literature on religious identity and
cooperation.
There is a small literature on religious identity and cooperation to
which our results may speak. Chakravarty et al. (2016b) study the role
of religious affiliation and religious fragmentation along Hindu-Muslim
lines on cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag Hunt game in
West Bengal, India. They vary the religious identity of the two players,
as well as the degree of religious fragmentation at the village level
(through choice of village). They find strong evidence of in-group biases
in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, but only partial evidence in the Stag Hunt
game. In-group biases were higher in villages that were socially frag-
mented, supporting the hypothesis that a given identity is more salient
in a heterogeneous society. Chuah, Hoffmann, Ramasamy, and
Tan (2014) find similar evidence of religious in-group biases in the
Prisoners’ Dilemma in Malaysia.
The fact that we find small estimates on group-contingent other-
regarding preferences suggests that the large differences in cooperation
in the aforementioned studies might not be explained by social pre-
ferences alone. Our evidence, in addition to existing evidence from
social dilemma games, suggests that social preferences play a limited
role in determining behavior in circumstances in which a religious
identity is relevant.
2. Social identity theory
The theory of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986), postu-
lates that individuals derive well-being from group membership, even if
said membership provides no survival benefits. This positive group
identity comes in large part from favourable comparisons with those
who do not belong to one’s group. Social identity theory argues that
individuals belonging to a social group exhibit positive biases towards
other members of the same group relative to individuals who do not
belong to the same group.
2.1. Incorporating social identity in social preferences
Chen and Li (2009) extend the utility function proposed by
Charness and Rabin (2002), which assumes economic agents derive
(dis)utility not only from their own wealth, but also from wealth dif-
ferences with regards to other agents.1 Eq. (1) describes a simplified
version of Charness and Rabin’s functional form2:= + +U r s( ) ( ) ,i i i i j i j i (1)
where =r 1 if πi> πj and 0 otherwise; =s 1 if πj> πi and 0 otherwise.
The ρ parameter captures our attitudes to inequality in income when
we are better off than our counterpart; σ captures our attitudes to in-
equality when we are worse off than our counterpart. This formulation
coincides with the model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) if
σ≤ ρ≤0 (Charness and Rabin, 2002, p.823), but it can also encompass
spiteful/competitive preferences if σ<0< ρ<1.
This model can be easily extended to incorporate group-contingent
social preferences. Let =g I O, , where I and O stand respectively for in-
group and out-group. Charness and Rabin’s modified, group-contingent
model of social preferences becomes:
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The social identity model predicts that individuals care about the
welfare of in-group members more than that of out-group members.
This implies that <iI iO and <iI iO. That is to say, player i places
more weight on interpersonal comparisons of income between herself
and out-group members than between herself and in-group members. A
consequence of this assumption is that individuals will tolerate higher
degrees of inequality within their in-group than across social groups.
2.2. Muslim and Hindu identities in West Bengal, India
Studying social identity is complex, especially given the difficulty in
isolating the identities which play a dominant role in socioeconomic
contexts. A key social institution which forges identity of an individual
in India is religion. Since the modern Indian state was formed in 1947,
religious divisions have caused social and economic tensions.
Turner and Brown (1978) suggest that there is an insecure relationship
1 For other theoretical models of social identity in economics, see Akerlof and
Kranton (2000), Basu (2007) and Shayo (2009).
2 Charness and Rabin’s functional form also includes a reciprocity parameter,
θ. Since our experiment does not test for reciprocity concerns, we do not con-
sider the full version of that utility function.
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between Hindus and Muslims. The tension between the two commu-
nities is caused in part by India, after partition, being Hindu dominant,
as well as the fact there has been a reversal of power relations, as
Muslims provided most of the ruling elite a couple of centuries back.
The underlying division between the two religious groups has often
manifested itself in conflict and violence in regular intervals, with over
7000 deaths between 1950 and 2000 (Mitra & Ray, 2013). Such regular
conflicts suggest that the religious differences are socially entrenched in
India.
Bengal has been politically divided twice on religious (Hindu-
Muslim) lines, both in 1905 and in 1947.3 Both partitions caused
significant involuntary human displacements, with Muslims mi-
grating to East Bengal (East Pakistan or Bangladesh at present) and
Hindus moving in the other direction to West Bengal.4 There have
also been major violent incidents attributed to religious conflict be-
tween Hindus and Muslims after 1947 (Akbar, 2003; Brass, 2003).
The violence and religious tension between the two groups has con-
tinued in the state as seen recently in the riots in Canning in 2013 and
Deganga in 2010.
According to the Census of India 2001, 80.5% of the total Indian
population is Hindu and 13.4% is Muslim. The Muslims are the majority
in the states of Lakshadweep and Jammu & Kashmir. The percentage of
Muslims is sizeable in Assam (30.9%), West Bengal (25.2%), Kerala
(24.7%), Uttar Pradesh (18.5%) and Bihar (16.5%). In West Bengal, the
state in which we conduct our study, 5 districts have significant Muslim
population, two of which are Murshidabad and Burdawan (the districts
in which we carry out our experiments). In West Bengal there are
64.63% Hindus and 33.45% Muslims in rural areas and there are 85.26
Hindus and 13.24% Muslims in urban areas.
John and Mutaktar (2005) document that economic and social
indicators are marginally worse for the Muslims in India. In rural
areas there is a marginal difference in poverty ratios between Mus-
lims and Hindus in India, but difference is more significant in urban
areas. The authors estimate marginal per capita expenditure index for
Muslims (Hindu = 100) for across India is 96.3; in West Bengal it is
86.63 in rural areas and 90.54 in urban areas. According to head
count data on poverty, 36.96% Muslims are counted as poor and
28.7% Hindus are poor in rural West Bengal. In West Bengal, 31.7%
are poor, while the India-wide rate of poverty is 27.02%. The Hindu-
Muslim literacy gap in rural West Bengal is 11.2% (Hindus 66.8% and
Muslims 55.6%) and in urban West Bengal it is 17.5% (Hindus 83%,
and Muslims 66%).
3. Experimental design and procedures
3.1. Experimental design and village selection
To study the effect of religious fragmentation on social preferences,
we sampled our participants from three different types of villages,
based on their religious composition: “Homogeneous - Muslim” and
“Homogenous - Hindu” villages, where 90% or more of the village’s
population was of one religion, and “Fragmented” villages, where no
more than 60% of the village’s population was of one religion. Village-
level data on religious composition is not publicly available data — the
Indian Census data only provides religious composition data at the
district level. To circumvent this problem, we selected our villages
based on data from Das, Kar, and Kayal (2011), who conducted a large-
scale household survey on the effects of religious fragmentation in West
Bengal villages.5
In order for this quasi-experimental design to be valid, we require
village composition to be exogenous. If people self-select into different
villages on the basis of their religious breakdown, we would not be able
to identify the causal mechanism between fragmentation and beha-
viour. In India, rural-rural migration is predominantly due to marriage,
whereby women move to their husband’s village; other motives include
family reasons, employment and education (Bhattacharya, 2000). All of
these motives are uncorrelated with a village’s religious composition.
About 70% of our participants reported having been born in the village
and/or their father and grandfather being born in the village. Another
potential concern with using a quasi-experimental design is that the
participant sample systematically differs on the basis of the type of
village (i.e. homogeneous vs. fragmented) we sampled. We are con-
fident that this is not the case on the basis of data on observable
characteristics we collected from participants, including gender, age,
caste, profession, marital status, place of birth, land ownership and
literacy — see Table 4. We are therefore confident that our assumption
about the exogeneity of villages’ religious composition holds.
In the fragmented villages, we conducted four different types of
treatments, each of which refers to a matching protocol. The M-M
(i.e. Muslim-Muslim) treatment consisted of sessions in which all
participants were Muslim. Likewise, the H-H (i.e. Hindu-Hindu)
treatment was such that the only participants were Hindu. The H-M
(i.e. Hindu-Muslim) treatment consisted of sessions in which half of
the participants were Hindu and the other half were Muslim, and
participants knew they were playing someone from another religion.
Finally, the MIX treatment consisted of sessions with both Hindu and
Muslim participants, but where the religious identity of their match
was uncertain. We elaborate on how we accomplished this when we
describe the experimental procedures below. In the homogeneous
villages we conducted only H-H or M-M sessions, the religious com-
position of these villages meant in most cases there were very few or
no residents of the other religious group. Table 1 describes the ex-
perimental design.
3.2. Participant recruitment
We employed a mixed-gender, mixed-religion team of local research
assistants to recruit participants and conduct the sessions, so as to
minimise any possible experimenter demand effect. A week ahead of a
planned session, our research assistants travelled to the village where
that session would take place. A set of neighbourhoods were randomly
selected, and within each neighbourhood, recruitment was done on a
door-by-door basis. On a given street, every two consecutive houses
were skipped and the third house would be approached and those who
agreed to participate would be signed up. Participants were reminded
about the session the day before it took place. Participants did not know
the purpose of the experiment: when approached, they were informed
that the research team would be conducting decision-making sessions.
We conducted one session per village.6
3 The first partition of Bengal along Hindu-Muslim lines was during the
British rule in 1905; the second partition of Bengal into West Bengal and East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) took place in 1947, when the modern Indian state
was formed.
4 An estimate of migration in Bengal during 1947, notes that around 6.31% of
the local population migrated to East Bengal and 8.47% migrated to West
Bengal (Bharadwaj, Khawaja, & Mian, 2008).
5 The village selection was further restricted by whether or not a given village
would have an appropriate building for the running of sessions — we opted for
villages that had a primary school. The villages that fit our demographic cri-
teria, had a primary school, and whose local authority would allow us to use it
were the following: Alampur, Bhurkunda, Char Mathurapur, Chupi, Domohani,
Ganfulia, Gokarno, Hasanpur, Jhikra, Kanakpara, Kirtipur, Pilsowa, Roshanpur,
Shuhari, Sridharpur and Tungi.
6 After the first session in the first village, it was clear that participants dis-
cussed the experiments among their social network. Due to a combination of the
novelty factor and the generous incentive payments, the sessions themselves
raised interest among villagers in the hours after the sessions ended, therefore
contaminating the pool of potential participants in that village.
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3.3. Experimental procedures
We made religious identity salient by making the names of parti-
cipants common knowledge, and by allowing participants to visually
identify their potential counterparts in the games participants played.
This is a combination of two existing methods of making identity
salient: Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein (2007) in-
duce ethnic identity in experiments conducted in Uganda using pho-
tographs of participants, while Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) induce
ethnic identity in experiments conducted in Israel using participants’
names.
Sessions took place in the village’s school building. Upon arrival,
participants were asked to remain outside the main school building and
wait for their name to be called out. Upon hearing their name, each
participant was taken to the main classroom, and told to sit at one of the
ends of the classroom, facing the middle. It is reasonably easy to
identify someone as a function of their name, since Muslim names are
quite different from Hindu names. Calling in participants individually
made their religious identities salient (and established the existence of
an out-group) in an inconspicuous way.7
Participants were told they would be making a series of decisions
with someone on the other side of the room, and they were told that
they would always make each decision with a different person. This
allowed participants to identify the religious identity of their potential
counterparts, either through their choice of attire, or by recognising
participants across the room.8 However, since there were 13 to 20
participants on either side of the room (the average session size was 32;
the smallest session size was 26, and the largest was 40), it was im-
possible for participants to know who their counterpart was in each
game, therefore preserving the anonymity of decisions – this was im-
portant since 83% of participants stated in the post-experimental
questionnaire that they recognised most of the participants in the
room.9
In the H-H and M-M sessions, all subjects in the room shared the
same religion, so the seating arrangement was irrelevant. In the H-M
sessions, Hindu subjects were all seated in one end of the room, while
Muslim subjects sat in the other end; finally, in the MIX sessions, Hindu
and Muslim subjects sat on both ends of the room.
We split sessions in three parts. In the first part, participants played
three games: the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Stag-Hunt game and the
Tullock contest (in that specific order). In the second part of the session,
participants played a series of mini-dictator game, which we describe
below.10 In the third part, participants individually responded to a
questionnaire in a separate room, got feedback on the decisions made in
the experiment, and received their corresponding payment.11
An experimenter standing in the middle of the room read the in-
structions aloud using visual aids to explain the incentive structure of
each game (see Appendix for the experimental materials). We did not
employ written instructions since about a third of our subjects was ei-
ther unable to read or write or could only sign their name. As such, we
denoted payoffs in INR and used images of Indian notes and coins to
represent payoffs. See the supporting materials for copies of the in-
struction sets, the visual aids we used as part of explaining the game,
and the decision forms.
A potential pitfall of running experiments in which subjects do
multiple tasks is that there may be contamination of behavior across
games, such as order effects, wealth effects, behavioral spillovers or
hedging. Order effects are certainly possible in our experiment. They
could affect behaviour in the dictator game by priming subjects on the
efficiency gains from cooperation, which could lead to choices that
maximise the joint payoff to be chosen with higher probability.
However, the hypotheses of interest are on differences in behaviour
across villages and/or treatments, all of which were exposed to the
same order of play. We minimised the scope for wealth, spillover and
hedging effects in our experiment by (a) not informing subjects of the
games they were about to play ahead of time; (b) not providing feed-
back between games; (c) implementing a turnpike matching scheme,
whereby subject i was never matched with the same person twice, and
any of i’s matches would never play each other. Subjects were reminded
of these features at the start of each game.
Given that a substantial proportion of subjects could not read or
write, we opted to administer a consent form verbally. Before the start
of the session, an experimenter read a statement explaining that sub-
jects’ decisions would be strictly anonymized, that all decisions would
be identified only through an ID number, which would not be matched
with their name. Subjects were free to leave the session at any time, and
they also had the right to opt out from the study and having their data
removed from the study. An English language copy of the verbatim
consent text is in the Appendix. This study was approved by the
University of Exeter Business School Ethics officer (IRB equivalent).
Sessions as a whole lasted on average three hours. The average
payment for the whole session was INR 598.70 ($9.65). The average
daily wage for a rural worker in West Bengal in 2011 ranged from INR
105 ($1.74) for an unskilled female worker to INR 297.50 ($4.93) for a
male well digger; in most agricultural occupations average daily wages
were approximately INR 130 ($2.15), Government of India (2012).
3.4. The task
The instructions explained the mini-dictator games as a choice be-
tween two alternatives, presented side-by-side. Each alternative yielded
a monetary payoff to the decision-maker and to someone else on the
other end of the room. In order to account for the fact that many sub-
jects were illiterate, we denoted payoffs using currency images.
Subjects were handed a booklet; subjects chose their preferred outcome
Table 1
Experimental design.
Treatment
M-M H-H H-M MIX
Village type Homogenous - Muslim (94, 3) – – –
Fragmented (40, 1) (70, 2) (130, 4) (58, 2)
Homogenous - Hindu – (124, 4) – –
Note: (# of subjects, # of villages).
7 Eliciting religious identity through names could have also elicited partici-
pants’ caste identity as well. We control for this possibility in the econometric
analysis of the data, and our results are robust. Please see Table 9 in the
Appendix for a breakdown on caste information.
8 The experiments were unusual events in the villages, and many participants
came to the sessions in formal attire. In rural Bengal, Hindu men wear “dhoti,” a
long white cloth draped around the waist, and Muslim men wear “lungi,” a
piece of checkered cloth also worn around the waist. Hindu women wear
“saris,” as well as “bindi” on their forehead, while Muslim women wear
“salwar” and “kamiz” and no “bindi.”
9 This was consistent across sessions; 13 out of 16 sessions had between 75%
and 100% of participants stating that they recognised most others in the room.
The other three sessions had rates of 56%, 63% and 69%. The average in the H-
H, M-M and H-M treatments is 81%, 88% and 85%, respectively.
10 The data from the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag Hunt game, as well as the
Tullock contest are the focus of two companion papers (Chakravarty et al.,
2016b; 2016a). We analyse the dictator game data independently of the data
from the other games because there are order effects which undermine our
ability to make inference on any causal effect between other-regarding pre-
ferences and behaviour in these games.
11 Repeated interactions might have influenced the degree of identification
with the in-group/out-group, particularly in the MIX condition. The no-feed-
back feature of the experimental design should minimise the chance of this
occurring.
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by ticking a box corresponding to their preferred alternative (see
Appendix). The instructions also told subjects that they would receive a
separate payoff on the basis of the choice made by someone else in the
room. However, that person would not be the same person whose
payment would be determined by their decision. Table 2 outlines the
nine different choices made by participants in the mini-dictator ex-
periment.
3.5. Subject characteristics
We next outline the basic characteristics of our sample. In parti-
cular, we wish to understand whether the participant subsample from
homogeneous villages differs in a systematic way than the subsample
from fragmented villages. To this effect, we compare the two types of
villages, pooling the two types of homogeneous villages on a number of
characteristics, including caste, marital status, place of birth (both the
subjects’ and their next-of-kin), land ownership, profession, and literacy
level.
Table 3 displays the proportion of subjects in each type of village
that belong to each of 37 categories. We do not find large discrepancies
on any category, although some of the differences are statistically sig-
nificant using Fisher’s exact test. The two differences that are worthy of
note are the proportion of advantaged caste subjects, which is ten
percentage points higher in Homogeneous villages, while OBC subjects
are more prevalent by eight percentage points in Fragmented villages.
We also sampled more subjects who either finished or were enrolled in
tertiary education in Homogeneous villages. Nevertheless, we reiterate
that we do not find systematic differences across multiple categories;
even those categories where we there are significant differences, these
are not sufficiently large to warrant concern.
We estimate an OLS regression with a dummy variable for frag-
mented villages as the dependent variable and all subject characteristics
in Table 4 as the independent variables. The regression is overall sig-
nificant ( = <F p(32, 484) 2.68, 0.01). Although most of the individual
variables are insignificant, as expected from Table 4, the overall sig-
nificance seems to be driven by few variables such as the dummy for
scheduled caste/tribe and whether the subject is a tobacco worker or
not. Subsequently, we conducted a F-test to find out whether the in-
significant variables jointly have any explanatory power. This F-test
included 25 variables with data on gender, age, marital status,
birth place, land holdings, unemployment rate, housewife, student,
office worker, seamstress, education, literacy and other variables
from Table 4. This joint test could not reject the null
( = =F p(25, 484) 1.35, .12), implying that these subject characteristics
do not together explain the village type (fragmented or not).
Using 2011 census data, we compare village characteristics between
fragmented and non-fragmented villages. We test for differences using
the Mann-Whitney test due to the small sample size. Specifically, we
compare villages on their size (number of households), population,
unemployment rate and illiteracy rate. Homogeneous villages are
smaller than fragmented villages, both in terms of number of house-
holds (1550 vs. 622, = =z p2.170, 0.030), and population (6942
vs. 2768, = =z p2.064, 0.039. However, both village types have similar
illiteracy rates (0.42 vs. 0.39, = =z p0.477, 0.633), while homogeneous
villages have slightly higher unemployment rates than fragmented
villages (0.66 vs. 0.58, = =z p2.248, 0.025). We do not report a joint
test of significance as the village sample size is too small. The fact that
homogeneous villages are smaller may mean that individuals from
those localities will be more likely to know each other than in frag-
mented villages and therefore display higher other-regarding concerns
– this may mean we are underestimating the effect of fragmentation on
preferences.
3.6. Hypotheses
The primary focus of this paper is to understand how social frag-
mentation affects social preferences. We take a two-pronged approach:
first we fix village-level religious composition and examine differences
in other-regarding preferences when they apply to in-group members
and out-group members. We then focus on in-group/in-group interac-
tions and compare fragmented villages to homogeneous villages. We
put forward our alternative hypotheses; the null throughout is that
Table 2
Mini-dictator decisions.
Left option Right option
My payoff Other’s payoff My Ppayoff Other’s payoff
Task 1 70 20 50 50
Task 2 80 0 50 40
Task 3 50 0 40 50
Task 4 70 20 50 60
Task 5 40 40 30 100
Task 6 60 60 50 40
Task 7 40 120 30 20
Task 8 50 90 30 40
Task 9 70 70 70 20
Payoffs denoted in INR.
Table 3
Subject characteristics as a function of village type.
Variable Fragmented
villages
Homogeneous
villages
p-value
Male 0.45 0.49 0.374
Age 35.24 (12.26) 33.52 (13.05) 0.127
SC 0.18 0.20 0.821
ST 0.00 0.02 0.168
OBC 0.16 0.08 0.003
Advantaged Castes 0.60 0.70 0.020
Single 0.18 0.24 0.098
Married 0.77 0.71 0.188
Widowed 0.04 0.04 0.823
Divorced 0.01 0.01 0.640
Separated 0.00 0.01 0.425
No Family Status 0.00 0.00 1.000
Born Here 0.69 0.71 0.699
Spouse Born Here 0.42 0.43 0.787
Father Born Here 0.65 0.69 0.346
Landless 0.01 0.03 0.179
Contracted Labourer
Landless Farmer 0.12 0.15 0.294
Landless 0.11 0.05 0.011
Non-contracted
Labourer
Landed Less 0.5 H 0.06 0.05 0.711
Landed Less 1H 0.08 0.06 0.500
Landed More 1H 0.03 0.04 0.804
Seamstress 0.09 0.09 0.877
Student 0.08 0.15 0.024
Office Worker 0.02 0.02 0.739
Unemployed 0.03 0.06 0.048
Housewife 0.26 0.18 0.034
Attendant 0.03 0.01 0.080
Tutor House 0.01 0.01 1.000
Healthworker 0.00 0.00 1.000
Govt Rep 0.03 0.01 0.080
Quack 0.01 0.00 0.510
Tobacco Worker 0.03 0.10 <0.001
Other 0.01 0.01 1.000
Retired 0.00 0.01 0.076
Illiterate 0.20 0.19 0.911
Sign Name 0.13 0.11 0.498
Primary Education 0.15 0.14 0.802
Secondary Education 0.41 0.39 0.716
Tertiary Education 0.10 0.17 0.026
Standard deviations in paretheses. p-values refer to 2-sided Fisher’s exact tests
except for “Age”, where they refer to 2-sided t-test.
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social identity and village fragmentation will have no impact on be-
havior.
Our first hypothesis comes from the literature reviewed earlier in
the paper, from both social psychology and experimental economics,
which postulates that individuals exhibit a bias in their concerns for the
welfare for their fellow in-group members. To test this hypothesis, we
compare treatments (within fragmented villages) where the likelihood
of being matched to an in-group member is 100% (i.e. H-H or M-M) to
treatments where that likelihood is either 50% (MIX) or 0% (H-M).
Hypothesis 1. In fragmented villages, the estimated ρ and σ will
increase in the probability of facing an out-group member.
We now turn to the effect of fragmentation, and the possible role
social identity plays in determining behaviour. Brewer (1991) theorizes
that in-group identification is a function of two competing needs. On
the one hand, individuals have a need for inclusion: an isolated in-
dividual would seek to identify herself with a collective. On the other
hand, people require a degree of distinctiveness: members of very large
Table 4
Village characteristics as a function of village type.
Village Village type No. of nouseholds Population Illiteracy Unemployment
Bhurkunda Homogeneous 512 2539 0.43 0.54
Chupi Homogeneous 1596 7159 0.36 0.65
Hasanpur Homogeneous 893 3942 0.44 0.68
Kanakpara Homogeneous 303 1262 0.29 0.62
Roshanpur Homogeneous 482 2191 0.34 0.53
Shuhari Homogeneous 329 1319 0.41 0.53
Sridharpur Homogeneous 240 964 0.46 0.49
Alampur Fragmented 955 4206 0.32 0.55
Domohani Fragmented 2603 12,480 0.35 0.65
Ganfulia Fragmented 1179 5150 0.39 0.65
Gokarno Fragmented 3720 16,198 0.42 0.68
Jhikra Fragmented 913 3837 0.58 0.68
Kirtipur Fragmented 765 3098 0.48 0.69
Mathurapur Fragmented 1392 7112 0.44 0.72
Pilsowa Fragmented 323 1274 0.40 0.61
Tungi Fragmented 2103 9128 0.41 0.68
Fig. 1. Relative frequency of left option choices conditional on treatment in Fragmented Villages.
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groups may search for alternative identities through which they can
affirm their uniqueness. It follows that subjects’ sense of religious
identity should be less salient in villages where their own religion
dominates: individuals ought to identify with groups which provide
them with a better sense of uniqueness. In contrast, the salience of re-
ligious identity should be strongest in fragmented villages, since not
only there is an out-group to provide a comparison, but also because
both religious groups are equally numerous within the village. Existing
lab evidence supports this argument: Eckel and Grossman (2005) and
Charness et al. (2007) show in a laboratory setting that inducing group
identity is only effective if that identity is sufficiently salient. In other
words, group identity should be most salient in diverse villages, as
opposed to homogeneous ones.
Hypothesis 2. The estimated ρ and σ should be larger in absolute value
in fragmented villages than in homogeneous villages in both H-H and
M-M treatments.
An important caveat is warranted with regards to the final hy-
pothesis and our ability to test it. Village residency and religious
composition are not randomly and exogenously assigned. Although
rural-rural migration patterns are not a function of religious composi-
tion (Bhattacharya, 2000), it is possible that different villages have
evolved with different customs and norms, and that those norms
manifest themselves in different behavior in our experiment. We
therefore cannot offer a causal explanation for behavior in the event
that the data supports our second hypothesis; we can only offer a highly
plausible explanation, based on social identity theory.
We conclude this section with a remark about the two religious
groups that we are studying in this paper. Our model has nothing to say
about comparisons of behavior across groups. That is to say, we do not
have any a priori hypothesis about how other-regarding Muslims are
relative to Hindus, and how that relationship changes as a function of
fragmentation. All our hypotheses relate to the behavior of members of
one group, fixing village type and changing the identity of the other
player; or fixing the identity of the other player and changing the vil-
lage type. Perhaps our data might be useful to scholars interested in
cultural differences in behavior; those questions, however, are clearly
beyond the scope of the present paper.
4. Results
4.1. Econometric specification
We use a mixed-effects logit model to estimate the latent utility
parameters in Eq. (3).12 Hence, we account for the unobserved individual
heterogeneity which might affect the decision across observations per
individual. We report results from separate regressions run on the religious
sub-samples in each of the treatments separately, to facilitate the exposi-
tion of the results. To perform hypothesis tests on differences in para-
meters across different treatments, we ran a series of regressions using the
whole data set, where we interacted the ρ, σ parameters with treatment
dummies. The output from the pooled regressions is in Appendix A. We
also report q-values in the pooled regression output since we are testing
multiple hypothesis using these parameters. The q-values seem to be
reasonably small to mitigate any concerns due to false positives.
The utility of an individual i from choosing option =k L R{ , } in a
game n is given by,
= + + + + +U r s( ) ( ) ,ink k ink
g
g
in
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jn
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0
(3)
where ρ and σ capture player i’s attitude towards inequality when she is
better/worse off than her counterpart. While β measures the selfishness
motive, k0 captures the (payoff-independent) latent utility of choosing
k. ηi controls for the random effects which allows us to capture the
player specific unobserved correlation across all the games. ink is as-
sumed to be Type 1 i.i.d. error.
Since the left option in all choices gave the decision-maker (weakly)
higher payoffs than the right option —which was a feature of the design
by Charness and Rabin (2002)— the idiosyncratic utility from choosing
left ( k0 ) and the selfishness motive (β) are jointly determining pre-
ferences for the left option without regard for the other individual’s
welfare. Therefore, for ease of comparison among treatments, we only
keep the intercept term. Also, the mixed effects logit model combines+i ink into a single random error ,ink which gives us the following
specification,= + + +U r s( ) ( ) ,ink k
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We assume that the binary response variable yin, takes value 1 if player i
chooses L i.e. >U U( 0)inL inR . We estimate the following mixed effects
logistic regression,= = +Pr y x x( 1| , ) ( ( , , ) ),in in i in i (5)
where i=1, ...,N are clusters (= number of players) where each cluster
contains 9 observations. Λ is the logistic cumulative distribution func-
tion. The function xin(β, ρ, σ) can be represented as,= ++x r rs s( , , ) ( ) [( ) ( ) ][( ) ( ) ]i
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4.2. In-Group/out-group differences in preferences in Fragmented Villages
We start by providing summary statistics on behavior in each of the
mini-dictator games. These summary statistics are not the basis for any
hypothesis; they simply provide an illustration of behavior game-by-
game. We see marked differences in behavior in tasks 1–3, in which the
left option implies a favourable division of the pie which results in large
income inequality, and in which the right option gives a more egali-
tarian split of the pie, which also maximizes the total pie size. In these
three mini-dictator games, the fraction of own-payoff maximizing
choices is smallest in the H-H/M-M treatments, and it increases with the
probability of the other player being an out-group member. The other
six games put forward different trade-offs between equality and effi-
ciency, but there is no clear pattern to be discerned on the aggregate
level (Fig. 1). To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate the model in Eq. (4)
using data from fragmented villages only. Table 5 presents results from
the econometric analysis of treatment effects on preferences. We start
with the Muslim sample. The estimated ρ coefficient is lowest
(i.e. greatest advantageous inequality aversion) in the M-M condition
(M-M < MIX: z = 3.22, p < 0.01; M-M < H-M: z = 3.98,
p < 0.01); however, we find no difference between MIX and H-M
(z = 0.67, p = 0.51). A similar pattern applies to the estimated σ
coefficients, although the absolute differences in estimated coefficients
in M-M and the other two treatments are smaller and we find no sig-
nificant differences. (M-M = MIX: z = 1.01, p = 0.315 ; M-M = H-M:
0.47, p = 0.64; MIX = H-M: z = 0.91, p = 0.36).
In the Hindu sample, we observe a negative and significant coeffi-
cient on ρ in the H−H case, which is significantly smaller to the esti-
mated ρ coefficients in the MIX and H-M conditions (H-H < MIX:
z = 5.80, p < 0.01; H-H < H-M: z = 6.95, p < 0.01). The ρ coef-
ficients in the MIX treatment is only marginally significantly different
from zero (z = 1.82, p = 0.07). The coefficient on ρ in the H-M con-
dition is not significantly different from zero; the latter two coefficients
are also not significantly different from each other (MIX = H-M:
z = 0.91, p = 0.36). In the case of the σ coefficient, we only find a
12 Both Logit and Probit models give similar results. We also tried to use a
random coefficient utility model to account for individual heterogeneity, but
our panel wasn’t big enough to obtain stable parameter estimates.
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marginally significant coefficient on H-M (z = 1.83, p = 0.07).
Observation 1. Muslims’ and Hindus’ aversion to advantageous
inequality declines as the probability of facing an out-group member
increases. We find no evidence of aversion to disadvantageous
inequality on either religious sample.
4.3. Village-level fragmentation and the salience of social identity
We again start by examining aggregate choices for each of the nine
games. Again, the most salient differences come from the first three
mini-dictator games (first row in Fig. 2. This time, the proportion of
“selfish” left choices is smaller in fragmented villages than in homo-
geneous villages in all the three cases and for both religious groups. In
the other six games, there differences between village types are less
accentuated.
We now formally test Hypothesis 2, which states that fragmentation
along religious lines should make religious identities more salient and
therefore the effect of group membership on preferences stronger.
Table 6 displays the results of estimating Eq. (2) on the M-M and H-H
Table 5
Estimated , and coefficients as a function of recipient’s identity in fragmented villages.
Muslim sample Hindu sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
M-M Mixed H-M H-H Mixed H-M
ρ ***0. 0202 **0. 0110 **0. 0075 ***0. 0223 0. 0066* −0.0030
(0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0030)
σ −0.0035 0.0018 0.0033 0.0010 0.0014 0.0060*
(0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0031)
β 0.5720 1.2560⁎⁎⁎ 0.7280⁎⁎ 0.7350⁎⁎⁎ 0.7960⁎⁎⁎ 0.3300
(0.3510) (0.4300) (0.2850) (0.1840) (0.2610) (0.3350)
Variance 3.7750⁎⁎⁎ 3.307⁎⁎ 4.1620⁎⁎⁎ 1.4450⁎⁎⁎ 1.314⁎⁎ 6.795⁎⁎⁎
(1.4420) (1.6680) (1.2900) (0.4410) (0.6330) (2.2270)
N 360 234 585 630 288 585
Individuals 40 26 65 70 32 65
Standard errors in parentheses. ⁎⁎⁎: p<0.01; ⁎⁎: p<0.05; *: p<0.10.
Fig. 2. Relative frequency of left option choices conditional on treatment in Fragmented and Homogeneous Villages.
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treatments in homogeneous and fragmented villages. Again for clarity
of exposition, we present the results from regressions on each of the
sub-samples separately. Hypothesis test results are based on a regres-
sions that pool both village types for a given religious sample. The
output from these regressions is in the Appendix.
We start with the Muslim sample: we do not find a significantly
higher coefficient on ρ in homogeneous villages than in fragmented
villages (z = 0.44, p = 0.66); interestingly, we find a small, positive
and marginally significant coefficient on σ in homogeneous villages,
while the σ coefficient in fragmented villages is not significant; the
difference between the two is significant (z = 1.91, p = 0.06). In the
Hindu sample, we do not find that the ρ coefficient in homogeneous
villages is significantly higher than in fragmented villages (z = 0.35,
p = 0.72). We however find that the σ coefficient in homogeneous
villages is negative and significant, and significantly smaller to that in
fragmented villages (z = 2.39, p = 0.017).
Observation 4. Village fragmentation has no effect on Muslim and
Hindu participants’ aversion to advantageous inequality in both
fragmented villages and homogeneous villages. The effect of village
fragmentation on aversion to disadvantageous inequality differs across
religious groups.
5. Discussion
In an increasingly globalised world, social fragmentation, be it at
the religious, ethnic or linguistic level, is gaining relevance both at a
political and social level. It is therefore important for social scientists to
be able to understand the relevance of social identity on preferences. In
this paper we jointly analyse the effect of religious identity and re-
ligious fragmentation on social preferences. While the evidence on so-
cial preferences is overwhelming, our understanding of how they are
affected by group membership is limited.
How social preferences work across group memberships is crucial to
our understanding of how individuals will value (and support through
their votes) different forms of redistribution through taxation.
Individuals that exhibit inequality aversion preferences should favour
more redistribution as inequality increases. If their inequality concerns
are group specific, this has dramatic implications for how taxation
funds are used. This is particularly so in a country like India: Hindus
and Muslims have a history of conflict, which has resulted regular
episodes of inter-religious conflict over the course of recent history.
Our findings are rather surprising. We find evidence of aversion to
being ahead, which declines as the probability of facing an out-group
member increases. In contrast we find very little evidence of aversion to
being behind; we only find some evidence of this for Hindu subjects
(and only within-group in homogeneous villages), not Muslim. This
suggests that income redistribution policies would be widely supported.
Interestingly, while inequality-reducing policies would clearly find
support, the lack of evidence for disadvantageous inequality aversion
means that it is possible that Pareto-improving policies that increase
inequality would also find support, particularly if they affect the out-
group (for whom inequality concerns are weakest).
Another key finding is that fragmentation makes the social identity
of players salient. This adds credence to Allport (1954)’s account that
social identity of individuals becomes more salient in fragmented so-
cieties or groups. We find that aversion to advantageous inequality
among both Muslims and Hindus is much stronger in fragmented vil-
lages in comparison to homogenous villages.
An important caveat to these findings is that the magnitude of the
estimated parameters is rather small. It is pertinent to place our findings
in the context of the rather large differences in cooperation rates in the
Prisoners’ Dilemma reported in our companion paper with the same
participants (Chakravarty et al., 2016b). The two pieces of evidence
suggest that the role of identity is perhaps stronger in shaping beliefs
about the behaviour of others, perhaps through the establishment of
norms of behaviour as suggested by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), or
through differentiated priors. The latter explanation is certainly a very
promising avenue of research.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101451.
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